The AfD’s Geopolitical Dilemma: A Farewell to Russia?
As the right-wing party maintains momentum in its quest for an electoral majority, its leaders might need to strip themselves of toxic policies. Perhaps the most disturbing part of the AfD’s agenda has long been its championship of a détente-like reconciliation with Russia amid the latter’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Apparently, this need for a strategic reversal may be felt increasingly by the party’s leadership – or, more precisely, a fraction of it.
This article examines the genesis of criticism vis-à-vis Russia within Alternative für Deutschland, discusses its possible origins and advocates for a change in the party’s external preferences for the sake of its normalisation.
This party is in Ukrainian as well on this link.
France and Germany have long been the two states central to European politics. While the somewhat traditional view has them as the driving forces of European integration, naturally, they’ve also become home to the two prime examples of right-wing, Eurosceptic political parties – The National Rally (RN) and the Alternative for Germany. As of 2025, the ever-increasing surge in right-wing parties’ popularity across Europe is still apparent.
However, as the right-wingers’ approval rating in polls is nearing (or, in RN’s case, transcending) a third of voters, dilemmas start arising. For one, there are limits to popular support of right-wing parties in the German electoral system, where leftist or centre-leftist actors (i.e., Bündnis 90/die Grünen, die Linke, SPD and BSW in Germany) take up around 40% of popular preferences.
Sure, the AfD capitalised on the FDP’s shortcomings as a coalition partner in Germany’s failed Traffic Light government, and won over a chunk of former Christian Democrats’ base, as well as some disenchanted SPD voters. A large portion of new supporters came from among those who previously did not vote, including first-time voters. Previously, the AfD to a large extent replaced die Linke as “the party of the East”, appealing to GDR nostalgia and pursuing hardliner anti-immigration policies in formerly Soviet-allied East Germany.
But how much longer can this steady climb last? Albeit an open-ended question, it implies that there is a dead end in terms of electoral resources. the AfD can’t keep cannibalising on right-leaning parties’ electoral base, let alone attract further portions of undecided voters forever. Once the far-right finishes first at the federal level, it will need to form a coalition. Naturally, the party aims to ally with a debilitated CDU, assuming Friedrich Merz’s current government tenure will prove unsuccessful.
An Austrian déjà vu?
Currently, however, any hopes to enter into negotiations with the CDU would crash against the so-called Brandmauer – a de facto commitment by the centrist parties not to cooperate with the AfD.
If everything remains as it stands in terms of ideological equilibrium, we’re likely to witness a repetition of the Austrian scenario of 2024-2025. After an initial failure to negotiate a coalition agreement with the SPÖ (social democrats) and NEOS (liberals), the ÖVP (Christian democrats) resorted to negotiations with Herbert Kickl’s FPÖ (right-wing populists), which had previously finished first in federal elections, leading by a small margin. The negotiations ultimately proved unsuccessful
From the outset, talks between the FPÖ and the ÖVP were overshadowed by differences, particularly on foreign and security policy issues. Aside from disagreements on various domestic issues, foreign policy became a major problem: the former were opposed to further support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. In addition, the FPÖ is extremely critical of the EU, while the ÖVP is deeply convinced of the advantages of the European Union. Ultimately, the ÖVP returned to negotiations with the SPÖ and NEOS, consequently forming the three-party coalition.
FPÖ members leaving the room as President Zelenskyy is set to deliver his speech. The signs read “A place for peace/neutrality.”30 March 2023. Robert Jaeger/APA
Of course, in Germany’s case, it’s hard to imagine what the distribution of votes will be like following the next parliamentary election. But if the centrist parties can’t form a majority, either by lack of mandates or by not reaching an agreement, the initiative may well be in the AfD’s hands. In that case, it won’t suffice for the right-wingers to just tear down the Brandmauer or for it to fall on its own. The same set of differences may arise when it comes to negotiations with the CDU/CSU.
Yet, a whole new circumstance must be taken into account. the AfD will probably be more inclined to form a coalition, as there might also be a prospect of a left-wing coalition comprised of die Grünen, the SPD and, most importantly, die Linke. The latter are currently on the rise, having levelled their support rate with the Greens, and being first in terms of popularity among the youth, both voting and preparing to vote.
To avoid repeating the scenario of FPÖ-ÖVP, the Alternative must alter parts of its agenda. One suggestion would be a gentle strategic reversal on Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The Russia problem
The general perception of the AfD is that the party is Russia’s major ally in Europe. Though a cliché, it does have solid grounds. For instance, Björn Höcke, the AfD leader in Thuringia and one of the Alternative’s most prominent figures, said in 2023 that, “[Russia is] a country that hopes it could possibly be a pioneer for a world of free and sovereign states.”
Markus Frohnmaier, an active MP, not only visited Crimea and justified its annexation by Russia, but was called an “absolutely controlled MP in the Bundestag” in a strategy paper, which was sent from the Russian Duma to the highest levels of leadership in the presidential administration.
Steffen Kotré, another MP, appeared on Russian TV in a show hosted by one of Russia’s most prominent propagandists, Vladimir Solovyov. Kotré claimed that German media outlets were inciting the population against Russia. In doing so, he was serving Kremlin propaganda: Russian state media outlets have been reporting for months that there is an anti-Russian sentiment in Germany that is being fueled by the government. Kotré also said that Germans are generally opposed to supporting Ukraine, which is a statement not backed by any reliable polling data.
There is also a record of Petr Bystron, an MEP for the AfD, accepting cash from the Russian-controlled internet network "Voice of Europe". The network is funded by Putin’s close ally Viktor Medvedchuk, as estimated by the Czech security service.
Tino Chrupalla (left) and Markus Frohnmeier (right) are among the most prominent AfD figures friendly to Russia. Michael Bihlmayer/dpa
To make matters worse, the AfD facilitated the activities of Vladimir Sergienko, a Berlin-based Russian activist making regular appearances on Russian state television. As of 2023, Sergienko was a staff member for the AfD member of parliament Eugen Schmidt, having full access to the buildings of parliament in Berlin. According to Der Spiegel, customs workers twice discovered large sums of cash on Sergienko after his many trips to Russia.
Apparently, the entire pro-Russia discourse is led by the party’s co-chairman, Tino Chrupalla. In an interview in late 2024, Chrupalla said he believes Russia “has already won the war.” His other statements included shifting responsibility for the war to the U.S., calling upon Ukraine to cede territory, blaming Ukraine for Russia’s increased airstrikes on Kyiv and questioning Germany’s NATO membership.
All of the above is just a tiny fraction of Russia-friendly or Russia-sponsored actions or statements made by the AfD so far. Formally, however, the party has called Russia’s attack on Ukraine a breach of international law and has called upon President Putin to end the hostilities back in 2022. In turn, this makes it more difficult to label the Alternative as strictly pro-Russian, particularly not de jure.
Still, in early 2025, the majority of AfD members refused to include a provision condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine in their electoral programme at a party congress in Saxony by a 69% negative vote. This leads us to conclude that, despite not having an absolute unity on the topic, as of now the AfD appears as a largely Russia-friendly party, sceptical of aid provision to Ukraine and willing to tolerate Russia’s modern-day imperial quest.
Or, we could frame this the other way round: despite being largely opposed to holding a Russia-sceptic stance, AfD members are far from united when it comes to siding with the Kremlin.
A different perspective from within
Indeed, there are AfD politicians who have repeatedly expressed their support for Ukraine. Some of them are vocal about it, too.
When President Zelenskyy delivered his second speech before Germany’s Bundestag in June 2024, 73 of 77 parliamentarians of the AfD left the room to boycott it. 4 remained: Rainer Kraft, Joachim Wundrak, Norbert Kleinwächter and Albrecht Glaser.
Wundrak, a retired Lieutenant General of the Luftwaffe, now a former MP for the AfD, also favoured sanctions against Russia, seeing as they would be “the only leverage”.
Kleinwächter, also an ex-parliamentarian as of 2025, said his presence was “a statement in itself” and refused to elaborate further. His name also came up when he left the room during his colleague Steffen Kotré’s speech in March 2022. He explained to have “distanced himself decisively from Putin’s gross propaganda, that Steffen Kotré spread in the Bundestag [that day].” In his speech, Kotré parroted Russian propaganda about Ukraine-based secret laboratories developing biological weapons.
Rainer Kraft, Joachim Wundrak, Norbert Kleinwächter and Albrecht Glaser listening to President Zelenskyy’s speech before the Bundestag. 11 June 2024. Christoph Soeder/dpa
83-year-old Albrecht Glaser not only stayed for Zelenskyy’s speech, but voted in favour of providing German arms to Ukraine. He was also the one to suggest the exact motion to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which was rejected in early 2025.
Finally, Rainer Kraft is the key supporter of Ukraine within the AfD. The only active MP of the four discussed, Dr Kraft has vouched for Ukraine multiple times and remains its vocal supporter. In the aftermath of Operation Spiderweb, which resulted in up to 41 aircraft being hit or destroyed by Ukraine deep behind the enemy’s lines in Russia, Kraft produced the following reaction: “As a patriot, I say: thank you for this action, which also makes Germany safer!”
A lone voice among the AfD ranks in the Bundestag, Rainer Kraft represents a silent, yet significant part of the party at large, which is inclined to take a rather hawkish stance on Russia.
Another serving MP who, albeit not as clearly, took a critical stance toward the AfD’s pro-Russian clique is Rüdiger Lucassen. Just like Joachim Wundrak, Lucassen is a retired NATO pilot (of a helicopter), which marks an interesting tendency for ex-NATO soldiers in the AfD to at least maintain a sense of tolerance for Ukraine’s right to self-defence. After Steffen Kotré had made his appearance on Russian TV, Lucassen called it a “treason of the people.”
But there’s an even more curious case. The aforementioned Dr Kraft also cherishes friendly ties to an AfD member who, similarly, serves as a very different example from the majority of his party’s members. This time, however, he’s a Gen Z-er who took his pro-Ukrainian stance to a whole new level.
The case of Tim Schramm
A 22-year-old from Westphalia, Tim Schramm served as a volunteer in the Armed Forces of Ukraine from March to June 2025. On the frontline, Tim was a mortar man and a drone operator. “We fired shots, were fired upon and attacked with drones,” he recalls. He believes Ukraine’s fight is Germany’s fight, too, even if one doesn’t have a personal sentiment towards Ukraine. For Schramm, defending Ukraine is all about “hardcore” German interests: cheap energy, economic cooperation, deterrence of aggressive wars and halting of mass migration. On the other hand, “Weapons for Ukraine are cheaper than German blood in the Baltics”, he concludes.
Rainer Kraft (left) and Tim Schramm (right) at the Bundestag Offices. The former can be seen wearing a pin with UA and DE flags. 9 October 2025. Tim Schramm/X
In his hometown of Wuppertal, he happens to be the deputy chair of the AfD district association. He’s also active on X (formerly Twitter), where he advocates for Ukraine and ridicules “boomers”, including his fellow seniors from the party. Even his fight for Ukraine was a “middle finger to the Russia-loving boomers”, as he himself puts it.
In a way, Tim Schramm’s position was inspired by none other than the AfD – their regional association in North Rhine-Westphalia, to be precise. According to Schramm, the association has always been Transatlantic in outlook. In 2022, shortly after the war began, they organised an aid convoy – three buses full of medical supplies, travelling directly to the war zone. That was Tim’s first contact with Ukraine.
Though naturally, Schramm’s service in the AFU came as a shock to his party upon his return. To say the least, the feelings are mixed. The executive committee of the North Rhine-Westphalia regional association presented Schramm with a document requiring him to pledge that he would not participate in any foreign military actions during his AfD membership, refrain from public statements or lectures on the Russia-Ukraine conflict until October 31, 2026, resign from all party offices, and not run for new ones until September 30, 2026. Schramm refused to sign, calling it a "gag order." Initially, the board led by Martin Vinzentz initiated Schramm’s expulsion from the party and suspended his membership rights. All of this – despite Vinzentz’s complimentary remarks to Schramm on his NIUS interview. The exclusion proceedings were significantly advanced by Hans Neuhoff, MEP.
Vinzentz’s deputy Sven Tritschler begged to differ. “From several conversations, I have the impression that people resent me for not joining the “jihad” against parts of the party, which has been paralysing and destroying our regional association for months <…> Apparently, to be marked as an enemy, all you have to do is not follow the line “from above” unreservedly,” says he as he claims Tim Schramm was even pressured to gather compromising information against him.
In spite of internal clashes, Mr Schramm holds his ground. “I didn’t literally lie in trenches only to surrender to geopolitical illiterates like Hans Neuhoff.” He is backed by Rüdiger Lucassen: “I hardly know anyone who would advocate for the victory of the Russian Federation as passionately, and demand as openly for Ukraine to wave the white flag, [as Hans Neuhoff]. Tim Schramm’s way of supporting Ukrainians’ fight for freedom as a combatant is, naturally, a completely opposite example.”
A foreign policy reflective of America
After returning from the battlefield, Tim Schramm decided to run for the Wuppertal City Council. His run proved successful. But the most interesting part was that Alice Weidel herself campaigned alongside the youngster. It remains unclear whether the two are acquainted or whether Weidel endorsed or condemned Schramm’s military service in Ukraine. One can only suppose such news couldn’t go unnoticed by the co-chairman of the largely pro-Russian party. Russia’s Western-oriented propaganda outlet RT did, in fact, grow alarmed – a headline of theirs reading “Why did the AfD leader Weidel support russophobes in the North Rhine-Westphalia election campaign?”
At any rate, Weidel’s current views on global affairs seem to differ from those of her co-chairman, Tino Chrupalla. At a press conference on 22 September 2025, the two expressed contradictory remarks on Russia’s drone incursion into Poland and the violation of Estonia’s airspace by Russian MiG-31s. Chrupalla downplayed the threat, hinting at the lack of information, expressing doubt as to the nature and origin of drones over Poland, and denying the violation of Estonia’s airspace as such. Weidel, much to the surprise of German news outlets, took a critical stance towards Russia: “I believe that Russia, too, is called upon to act in a de-escalating manner and not to further violate NATO airspace and test air defence systems.” She then went on to criticise Putin: “At some point, Putin will have to make a move, and unfortunately, we have seen too little of that so far.”
While this statement is relatively mild and doesn’t amount to a “U-turn” on Russia, it is still rather uncharacteristic of Alice Weidel we’ve known so far. Is it the same Weidel who, in 2022, blamed the West for starting the war in Ukraine, refused to call Vladimir Putin a war criminal, and pledged to rebuild the Nord Stream pipelines?
Moreover, in November 2025, Weidel and Chrupalla once again made completely opposite remarks regarding numerous AfD parliamentarians planning to undertake a trip to Sochi, where they would meet with Russian high-ranking officials at a forum. Weidel slammed the plans, saying she “cannot understand what one is actually supposed to do there [in Sochi]” and cited unrest within the AfD parliament faction as the trip “doesn’t make sense”. Chrupalla, on the other hand, defended his colleagues’ Wanderlust.
On 10 January 2025, Alice Weidel and Elon Musk met in an online conversation on X as part of the AfD’s electoral campaign. Jörg Carstensen/dpa
One explanation for Weidel’s change of tone would be that she is regarded as having close ties to the current US presidential administration. She was openly endorsed by Elon Musk during the 2025 general election, and in return, she wished “all the best blessings for their next tenure” to Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and JD Vance. Conversely, it was Weidel that the US Vice President decided to have a meeting with at the MSC in February, instead of then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
This mutual affection between MAGA Republicans and the AfD is only natural, as the two are ideologically close. They share a protectionist, anti-liberal, and anti-immigration sentiment, hold the same nationalist yet libertarian view on economics, and present themselves as anti-establishment.
However, there’s more to this than just ideological fraternity. Germany’s foreign policy has been reflective of America’s position when it comes to some of the most important global issues – like the war between Israel and HAMAS, or Russia’s war against Ukraine. Somehow, major German decision-makers tend to make decisions based on the stance of the White House.
Friedrich Merz is arguably a staunch Ukraine supporter, yet Germany’s foreign policy under his leadership is not a self-sufficient mental construct. It is motivated by what the U.S. appears willing (or unwilling) to do – and so is Merz’s advocacy for Ukraine. He steps in where the US should have, and holds back where the US does its part. Similarly, the shifts in Germany’s foreign policy, like the newfound desire for strategic independence, have only come about because of Trump’s neoisolationism, and not on their own. Germany only aims to rearm and expand its armed forces for fear of America’s unwillingness to defend Europe against Russia.
An even more striking example was Olaf Scholz’s decision to allow Leopard-2 MBTs deliveries to Ukraine. He was reluctant to give the green light since the outbreak of Russia’s invasion – until the Biden administration decided to provide Ukraine with a small batch of M1A1 Abrams MBTs. Similarly, Marder IFVs were only provided alongside M2 Bradleys. Germany under Scholz seriously lacked agency. It was perhaps for this reason that he had excellent relations with the US – a rare achievement for the former Chancellor.
What Alice Weidel is doing is very much Scholzian, only it’s Trump instead of Biden for her. Whereas there is no consolidated self-sufficient foreign policy outlook in the AfD, Weidel resorts to mirroring Trump’s agenda.
President Biden and Chancellor Scholz had a particularly strong bond. 18 October 2024. Marvin Ibo Güngör/Federal Government
This appears to be the proper explanation for her critical remarks vis-à-vis the Kremlin. As Trump grows irritated with Putin’s reluctance to negotiate a quid pro quo peace deal, his rhetoric becomes more hostile and partisan as opposed to his initial posturing as a neutral broker. Under such circumstances, it would have been unwise for Weidel not to follow suit, seeing as continuing to hold a Russia-friendly stance would amount to siding with Putin against Trump.
A reversal in sight?
Naturally, should Trump further change his position, Weidel will likely mirror it accordingly. Her recent remarks do not mark her taking a (somewhat) pro-Ukraine stance. Neither does Tim Schramm’s voluntary service in the AFU reflect consolidated support for Ukraine among the ranks of the AfD. There is no united stance in the party, but rather a mixture of opinions, where Russia sympathisers – the so-called Russenstusser – largely outweigh those siding with Ukraine.
Still, some minor cases might suggest an evolving sense of intolerance towards outright Russia supporters. Bruno Wolters, a journalist at Austrian right-wing magazine Freilich, suggests that there is a trend towards the exclusion of Russia-friendly actors in the AfD. As Wolters observed, the AfD’s candidate list for local elections in Berlin in October 2025 didn’t include Gunnar Lindemann. The latter is the most prominent AfD politician from Berlin, notorious for having illegally visited occupied Crimea in February 2018. Ultimately, Lindemann did get elected through a direct mandate. So, whether his non-inclusion in the candidate list was a calculation or a gesture of distancing remains unknown.
Or consider the AfD Bundestag faction’s fresh denial of clearance for a number of its members’ scheduled meeting with ex-President Medvedev, notorious for his edgy remarks against the US. At the same time, the Alternative’s Beatrix von Storch recently gave a warm praise to her party’s close ties to the Republicans before welcoming Trump advisor Alex Bruesewitz at the Bundestag. Which leads us to conclude that the choice for the AfD is between Russia and the US rather than Russia and Ukraine. That choice seems to have been made. After all, according to political scientist Benjamin Höhne, Russia has always been the AfD’s bread and butter in East Germany. Apparently, this doesn’t extend to the rest of the country anymore.
Be as it may, if the AfD takes itself seriously, it should eventually adopt a brand-new foreign policy program – with a newfound sense of agency instead of mimicking Russian or American talking points. So far, the AfD speakers have been successful in trying to appeal to the public’s fears of war, immigration, and economic decline. But shaping perceptions is just as important as employing them. That’s why the Alternative needs to take control of its narrative to make it coherent and proactive.
Embracing Ukraine’s fight as righteous and lawful, and striving to enforce peace upon Russia by enabling Ukraine to fight back, would help bridge the gap between the AfD and their conservative counterparts, paving the way towards a coalition government led by the Right. Otherwise, the party will retain its reputation of a bold-but-confused opposition, unable to rid itself of its toxic past.
Written by: Yaroslav Smovzh , Head of the Europe Research Programme at ADASTRA
Disclaimer: This article does not intend to express support for any political entity. Its contents are not to be interpreted as political agitation or advertising. ADASTRA is an impartial think tank and does not take positions on political matters.
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