Czechia, the new troublemaker in the EU?

In late 2025, Andrej Babiš, an ally of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico, was elected to become the new Prime Minister of the Czech Republic. Is he a new foe to the EU and Ukraine?

The elections in the Czech Republic in late 2025 were closely observed not just by its citizens but also by Brussels and Kyiv. There was a fear of yet another troublemaker, Andrej Babiš, entering the political scene and joining the isolated Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico. However, the reality turned out to be very different. Andrej Babiš, against all expectations and electoral promises, did not cancel the munition initiative and does not obstruct the decision-making of the EU.

This fear came partly from the radical policies of his international partners, Fico and Orbán and from a misunderstanding of the political reality in Czechia. To fully understand why the reality in Czechia is so different from that in Hungary or Slovakia, it is necessary to explore the political actors behind today’s government and the socio-historical trends in Czech society.

2025 Elections

As the 2025 election campaign intensified in the latter part of the year, the parties split into two blocks. The first comprised the outgoing government parties, and on the other side were today’s government forces, ANO, SPD, and Motoristé. 

ANO has continually been the largest party in the lower house since 2017. It is led by billionaire and entrepreneur Andrej Babiš, who has been embroiled in several financial scandals throughout his political career. Babiš tried to capitalise on the economic situation left by the previous government. This election, ANO pivoted toward far-right voters. Babiš called for cancelling the munition initiative and ending any military support for Ukraine.

From left to right: Tomio Okamura (SPD), Andrej Babiš (ANO), Petr Macinka (Motoristé), signing the coalition agreement. 2025 Josef Tomáš Hromada/Publico

More about Babiš and the pre-2025 political landscape in Czechia here.

SPD is the most popular far-right pro-Russian force in the Czech Republic. They are advocating for a referendum on Czechia’s NATO and EU membership. There are many controversies surrounding SPD, mostly related to their use of racist rhetoric during the election campaigns.

Motoristé is the youngest party to enter Parliament. They started their political career in the 2024 European Parliament elections, where they captured 10 per cent of the votes. They have built their image around cars, ‘anti-woke’, and anti-environmental rhetoric. They have, however, not given clear positions on international affairs. Filip Turek, the most popular member of the party, voted against most pro-Ukrainian legislation in the European Parliament. But the party leader, Petr Macinka, tried to make the party look more pro-Western.

More on the 2025 elections here

Government building

The first issue that the new government had to face was the personnel question. The two most contentious positions were the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Defence Ministry was given to SPD, which decided not to propose a party member, but an independent specialist. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given to the newcomers, Motoristé.

SPD decided to propose former high-ranking general Jaromír Zůna as defence minister. This choice proved controversial for SPD voters, as Zůna commented that nobody is questioning the munition initiative, that Russia is the aggressor, and that Czechia should continue supporting Ukraine. The leadership of SPD afterwards said that Zůna’s words were taken out of context, and he was prohibited from making public comments regarding foreign policy.

Motoristé decided to propose the popular Filip Turek as foreign minister. This was, however, turned down by President Petr Pavel, who refused to appoint Turek because of his history. Filip Turek is a controversial figure. There were several instances where he used Nazi symbolism and gestures. Shortly after election night, his old tweets resurfaced. In the tweets, Turek was racist toward the Roma community. Motoristé then proposed Turek for the Ministry of Environment, but President Pavel again refused. The party leadership was forced to back down after the president published private messages between his secretary and the Motoristé leader, Petr Macinka, in which Macinka allegedly blackmailed the president. 

Petr Macinka thus became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and proved to be an unexpected, if somewhat volatile, ally of Kyiv in today’s Czech cabinet. One of his first visits was to Ukraine, and he recently gave a speech at the UN during the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine that was acclaimed even by opposition figures.

Campaign promises vs. reality

One of the first issues regarding Ukraine that the new government had to address was the munitions initiative. The initiative is a program coordinated by the Czech government that was created in 2024 after Ukraine faced an acute shortage of artillery shells and after Western defence companies could not cope with the demand. The initiative works on the basis that the Czech Republic finds artillery shells on non-Western markets, where openly selling them to Ukraine would cause political problems. The Czech Republic then purchases them and ships them to Ukraine without disclosing the origin of the shells. The Czech government thus served as the coordinator, with major donors including Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. 

Andrej Babiš and SPD campaigned on cancelling this initiative for its lack of transparency and its cost to the Czech government. However, shortly after being elected, Andrej Babiš signalled that he would rather revise the initiative instead of fully cancelling it. After a few talks with NATO allies, the fate of the initiative was decided. The initiative will continue, but without direct Czech funding. Czechia will thus serve only as a coordinator, not as a contributor.

The reasons behind this change in position are not entirely clear, especially as this must have been very hard to get through ANO’s coalition partner, SPD, which was advocating for ending all help to Ukraine once in government. The key seems to be the combined pressure from international allies and President Pavel. The Czech government has never contributed significant amounts of money to the initiative, and thus, this change is rather a symbolic one.

The next Ukraine-related issue emerged when President Petr Pavel visited Ukraine in December 2026 for the third time and made comments about Ukraine purchasing four L-159 aircraft from the Czech army, a deal that had been on the table for some time.

This, however, spurred a controversy between Babiš’s government, the president, and the army. Defence Minister Zůna said that according to army reports, these aircraft are central to the defence capabilities of the Czech Army and therefore cannot be sold. This was countered by President Pavel and the Chief of Staff of the Czech Army, Řehka, who said that the army had, on the contrary, issued a report stating that Czechia could sell four of these aircraft without undermining the defence capabilities of the country.

Babiš decided to trust Defence Minister Zůna and ruled out any sale of these aircraft. Reality seems to be more complicated. As mentioned before, President Pavel leaked private correspondence with the Foreign Minister. Besides the alleged blackmail, Macinka also commented on the L-159 sale: 

Ps: Regarding the L-159s for Ukraine – the only reason they won't get them is that Petr Pavel spoke rashly about it in the media. I might have been able to convince Tomio (just as I talked to him about the munition initiative). But now that's no longer possible. Anyone (on Wednesday) can learn this truth.

This message offers a better understanding of foreign policymaking in today’s cabinet. Motoristé and ANO, to a certain extent, favour some amount of help to Ukraine. However, they must provide this support quietly and not draw attention to it. Every such decision must be fought for because of the opposition of the SPD. This creates a foreign policy full of surprises and inconsistencies.

Czechia as the next Slovakia?

What is then so different from the Slovak or Hungarian cases? First, the manoeuvring space for Babiš is much smaller than that of his counterparts. Second is Babiš’s coalition partners, as mentioned above. However, an even greater constraint is the constant pressure from President Pavel.

However, his pressure has its limits. Unlike the United States or Ukraine, Czechia is a parliamentary republic; therefore, the president’s powers are highly limited. Czech presidents are not the heads of the executive branch of government, but function as representatives of the state. The president has veto power over any legislation and appoints the prime minister and other ministers.

The president is part of the foreign policy shaping process, but only to a certain extent. While he has the right to negotiate and ratify international treaties, he can only do so with the approval of the prime minister.  This also means that no international treaty can be passed without the approval of the president.

The other issues that make the Czech case different are historical and social differences that are beyond the control of the political parties. The most striking one is the sheer unpopularity of Russia in Czechia. According to STEM, as many as 65 per cent of Czechs see Russia negatively and only 15 per cent positively. This is very different from Slovakia, where, according to CEDMO, as many as 18 per cent of the population would like to see a Russian victory in the war. In Czechia, this number is only 6 per cent. It is unimaginable for the Czech voter to see Babiš flying to Moscow and shaking hands with Putin as Fico or Orbán did.

The last important distinction is the historical realities that tie the Czech and Ukrainian causes together. In 1938, Czechoslovakia faced immense pressure from the German government to cede its majority German-speaking border regions, called the Sudetenland. Nazi Germany acted as the nation that only wanted to protect its nationals. Hitler managed to portray Czechoslovakia as an unreasonable country that was mismanaging its minorities and was warmongering. Under pressure from Germany and Britain, Czechoslovak ally France decided not to back Czechoslovakia and joined the Italian-led delegation in Munich, where the Munich Agreement was drawn without consulting the Czechoslovak government. Afterwards, the Czechoslovak government was presented with an agreement that Czechoslovakia would cede all the German-speaking territories and would receive very vague security guarantees from Britain and France. A year later, when Germany invaded the rest of the country, these guarantees resulted only in strongly worded letters. 

This rightfully led to dissatisfaction with the West. The USSR and the Communist Party had a relatively easy time becoming popular in post-war Czechoslovakia. However, the regime was rigid and faced one economic crisis after another. This led to a reform movement within the party taking over in 1968, introducing reforms to liberalise the economy and society. The Czechoslovak government received mixed but seemingly positive messages from the USSR regarding the reform program. It was a shock both for the party members and the populace when the USSR and Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of 20th to 21st August 1968. Once again, the Czech people felt betrayed by their allies. 

When the invasion started in 2022, these two national traumas again resurfaced in the Czech mind, and the parallels between the 21st-century Ukraine and 20th-century Czechoslovakia were impossible to ignore.

Why is Slovakia, then, so different when it experienced the same events? The reality is that the Slovak population did not experience these events in the same way as the Czechs did. Czechoslovakia was a highly centralised country and, thus, most political developments happened in Prague, far from the Slovak population centres. Slovakia first declared autonomy and then fully seceded from Czechoslovakia shortly after the Sudeten crisis. In 1968, Slovakia was far away from the reformist centre in Prague. Furthermore, Slovakia has shared history with Czechia only since 1918. Beforehand, it had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the Slovak national narrative is much more tied to Pan-Slavism, hence the popularity of Russia today.

Conclusion

Babiš finds himself in a tough spot, balancing differing opinions on Ukraine within his own party and among his two coalition partners, the pro-Russian SPD and the more West-leaning Motoristé. This creates a complex foreign policy landscape that is difficult to interpret. The Ukrainian government should anticipate Czechia fading into the background on the international stage, with financial and military aid diminishing to a minimum. However, Ukraine need not fear a realignment towards Russia. Such a move would be unpopular with both his voters and coalition members and could likely lead to his government’s fall. Ukraine should not seek to make Babiš’ government explicitly pro-Ukrainian but should instead focus on maintaining good relations with the existing Ukrainian-leaning politicians and accept that support will be modest and quiet, yet persistent.

Author – Lukáš Růžička, intern at the ADASTRA Analytical Centre

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