NATO has been constantly
facing challenging impediments of both internal and external nature. Indeed,
such obstacles have been hindering Alliance’s development, yet they also
determined the direction of the Alliance’s course of activities. In the act of enlargement,
it was reaching beyond its frontiers of operation and extending to new
dimensions such as outer space. Space issues seem to have become one of the
prioritized topics of the Alliance’s agenda.
Recently, during the
meeting of the Organization’s Defense ministers, new overarching space policy
has been approved. Moreover, the initiative to present space strategy during
the upcoming London summit enables the creation of the fully operational domain
at the ‘final frontier’. Nowadays this realm is the vital and contested
dimension, and the prospect of creating a full-fledged Space strategy by NATO
enables it to operate in line with the US Space force ideas and prove its
relevance in response to the Donald Trump’s criticism of the Alliance.
Read also: Integration of Allies’ National Cyber Effects into NATO Operations and Missions
This article will deal mainly with figuring
out how does the Alliance build its line of operation in the outer space, as
well as identifying main threats, which other state actors pose to the security
in this realm, and arguing why the Organization should not only rely on the
capabilities of its members, but also develop an integrated approach to the new
environment.
Background
The outbreak of the Cold
War brought about the evolution of the space industry, fueled mainly by the
competition between the United States and the USSR. The capabilities which
could be ensued from the usage of such a cutting edge space technologies
drastically changed the settings of the international system. Satellites alone
provided permanent real-time surveillance of the enemy, communication between
command centers and gathering of intelligence. The main problem back in the day
was that the majority of the astronautics industry was state-centered, which
meant that space industry resources and pertinent policy were determined by
Washington and Moscow. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 ushered in the era when
satellites became important devices for the interception of intelligence. The
need to acquire sensitive information triggered the situation when NATO had to
create its own space strategic communication network. In the 1960s the Alliance
gradually started to employ satellite technologies and effected the launch of
the new family of British military communication satellites Skynet. Yet after
operating four generations of NATO-family satellites, the Alliance decided to
rely exclusively on the space capabilities of its members. The main problem
identified in the Alliance’s attitude towards space is that it is missing a
holistic approach to the subject.[1]
Main
space-relating missions
Even though nowadays the
Organization is not in the possession of any space-based assets, it leases
those from its members to integrate the space realm for its purposes. The NATO
members possess 60% of all the satellites operable for the time being, so the
Alliance can conduct comprehensive space policy, without having its assets.[2]
Space situational
awareness. The advancement of private ventures,
encouraged by and cooperating with governments for pursuing commercial
opportunities, arising out of cargo delivery, manned flights and other
activities has resulted not only into a developed civil space sector, but also
into greater amount of space debris able to destruct space assets. In the
meantime, although remaining state-run, the military sector has also been
subject to changes, emanating from the new threats of which we will speak in
the next paragraphs. NATO Situational Awareness contributes to space control
operations including data collection about the space environment and tracking
operational status of assets and any potential threats related to Space. The
monitoring space environment is important both for mitigating consequences of
debris problem and for combating the danger posed by the Chinese and Russian
anti-satellite weapons as well as other military equipment. For the time being
NATO does not possess integral and all-round Space Situational Awareness
strategy, which is to be created if the Alliance plans to remain the kingpin of
international security. [3]
Satellite
communication. In order to maintain
strategic situational awareness, global coverage and connectivity of all
critical assets are required. Strategic communication is the constituent pillar
of the NATO, so SATCOM technologies proved to be pivotal with the deployment of
the abovementioned Skynet program, which means that NATO has sufficiently
mature satellite communication assets. Notably, despite the fact that the
United States represents 70% of the NATO space assets, European countries are
the main provider of SATCOM technologies. [2] Nowadays, in addition to British
satellites, NATO employs the capabilities of French SYRACUSE and Italian SICRAL
satellites. The NATO SATCOM Post-2000 (NSP2K) [3] program is being effected
under the auspices of those nations. Nowadays satellite communication is under
constant threat of being exposed to cyber-attacks. Chatham House paper on NATO
Space-based cybersecurity policy points out that “influencers and policymakers
are struggling to grasp the full impact of cyber vulnerabilities in the context
of both space-based assets and strategic systems”. [4]
Positioning,
navigation and timing of the Alliance are
reliant on the United States Global Positioning System (GPS) for space support
services. GPS is utilized both for civil purposes, helping road-users and other
civilians with navigation, and for military purposes, directing troops during
military operations. In addition, such Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) as Galileo satellite constellation, which is operated by the countries
of the European Union, can be important element to enhance the resilience of
the Alliance, due to the fact that not only potential adversaries such as the
Chinese People’s Republic and the Russian Federation possess independent GNSS,
BeiDou and GLONASS respectively, but are also trained to fight in a
PNT-degraded environment.[5] The main problem of incorporation of the Galileo
system is its multilateral nature because it includes six non-aligned EU
states, which makes its full integration into NATO military activities much
more difficult.[6]
Threats
Space debris.
A growing interest in outer space as a military frontier and commercial hub
leads to the greater number of objects deployed on the orbits. Today, space is
an extremely contested environment. For instance, a limited number of slots
available for satellites in geosynchronous orbit has already been occupied by
the states and commercial actors, which leads to jamming and interference. More
than sixty years of such activities have brought about a dangerous situation
when almost a million fragments from 1 cm to 10 cm and around 34 000 pieces of
debris more than 10 cm are floating around the Earth and are able to cause
total demolition of an asset. [7]
The hazard occurs during impacts, with those pieces reaching speeds to 16 km/s
colliding with operating space objects. Their Security of space assets and the
“sustainability of outer space activities” are endangered by the presence of
space debris and other objects coming from the space.
ASAT weapons.
There are several sources from which space debris are created, however,
anti-satellite tests are the most dangerous inasmuch they do not only lead to a
greater amount of debris, but also raise urgent questions of space
militarisation, which are to be addressed by NATO. Such technologies are used
to destroy satellites for military purposes. The most notorious example is 2007
China’s Anti-satellite test, when the world was bewildered by the Beijing’s
decision to destroy one of its weather satellites by means of a kinetic kill
vehicle, which left hundreds of satellite debris and proved the capability of
the People’s Liberation Army to protect from satellite surveillance, whenever
full-scale war breaks out. [8]
To date, Chinese army exploits anti-satellite rockets, such as DN-3, able to
destroy satellites at orbits up to 1000 km. The dual nature of space assets, used both for
civil and military purposes, hinders to identify the exact number of all
anti-satellite tests, which are often disguised. Moreover, the stationing of
ASAT weapons is not expressly prohibited by any Space law international
instrument. The possession by Russia and China of such anti-satellite
technologies creates a dangerous situation [9],
which NATO shall take into consideration, inasmuch to-date it has no programs
which would help it to defend against ASAT weapons.
Cyberwarfare.
Yet in some cases of warfare adversary’s satellites will not even have to be
demolished. It has already been pointed out that SATCOM can be easily exposed
to hacker attacks, so the intrudes would physically be able to gain access to
the systems and “either compromise them for later use or alter their
instructions”. The root of the vulnerability lies in the obsolete hardware and
unprotected software, which can be easily hacked e.g. in the scenario of
Russian cyberattacks. Thus, cyberthreat to space-based command and control
systems is to be addressed.
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All NATO operational
domains rely heavily on the support of space assets, so the outline of a
holistic approach towards outer space frontier is of the utmost importance.
Given changing Astropolitics trends, a commercial revolution of the space
industry and strengthening of China and Russia, the Alliance’s decision to push
on with the development of the ever-integrated Space policy approach seems to
be suitable for demonstrating its relevance, resilience, and far-sightedness.
Dmitrii Borzenko, Senior Fellow for Space Policy in Think Tank ADASTRA
Sources:
1.
Remuss, Nina-Louisa.
«NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?.» ESPI Perspectives 40
(2010).
Retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124749/ESPI_Perspectives_40.pdf
2.
Giudice, Flavio, and John
Patrick. “The Key Role of Space Support in NATO Operations.” The Three
Swords Magazine, no. 32, 2017, pp. 58–65.,
Retrieved from: www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/_news_items_/2017/SPACESUPPORT_NATO_ThreeSwordsJuly17.pdf.
3.
Single, Thomas. «NATO
Space Operations Assessment.» Joint Air Power
Competence Centre (JAPCC) (2009).
Retrieved from:
https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/NATO-Space-Ops-Assessment-Jan-09.pdf
4.
Unal, Beyza.”
Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets”,
Chatham House (2019)
Retrieved from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-27-Space-Cybersecurity-2.pdf
5. McDermott,
Roger N. «Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025.» ICDS Report, September (2017)
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https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf
6. Vassen, Rim. “Is NATO Ready for
Galileo?”, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (2019)
Retrieved from: https://www.japcc.org/is-nato-ready-for-galileo/
7. Space debris by the numbers, ESA
Retrieved from: https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers
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Zississ, Carin “China’s
Anti-Satellite Test”, Council on Foreign Relations (2007)
Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test
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Харківського національного університету Повітряних Сил. – 2017. – No 2 (51). –
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